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What Standards Apply When Freedoms Collide?
by Neal Devins

Seattle Times Company, et al.

v.
Keith Milton Rhinehart, et al.
(Docket No. 82-1721)
To be argued February 21, 1984

legal action. The tough question is what standard the
courts should apply in determining whether there is
good cause to limit the press' right to publish. The Seattle
Times case will help answer that question. Considering
the paramount interests involved, this lawsuit is of great
significance.
FACTS

ISSUE

Freedom of the press is pitted against freedom of
religion and access to the judicial system in Seattle Times
Company v. Rhinehart. Although the Supreme Court will
not have to determine whether any of these central
constitutional values takes precedence over the other,
the Court will have to determine how concrete a claim of
infringement of religious liberty must be before a court
can interfere with the rights of our free press. Specifically, the case questions whether and when it is constitutional for a court to prohibit publication of information
learned about the Aquarian Foundation (a so-called religious cult) in the course of civil discovery. The Aquarian
Foundation alleges that publishing such information will
discourage its members from instituting the underlying
civil action. The freedom of religion and freedom of
press claims are heightened in this case because the
initial civil action is a suit for slander by the Aquarian
Foundation against the Seattle Times.
Religious organizations clearly have a right to seek
both expansion of their membership and financial support. This right is central to our constitutional scheme
and thus courts should be accessible to claimants seeking
to protect their right to free exercise of religion. At the
same time, this right does not protect such organizations
from unfavorable press coverage. If our society is to
function as an open marketplace, people should not be
denied access to information. As far as information
made available to the press through its own initiative,
this "right to publish" is almost absolute. (A prime example is the "Pentagon Papers'· lawsuit.) Yet, it does not
seem unreasonable that this ··right to publish" should be
limited when the press gains information through the
civil discovery process of a lawsuit in which it is a party
- especially when publishing such information might
ultimately make it impossible to pursue the underlying
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The Seattle Times ran a series of articles about a small
religious group called the Aquarian Foundation and its
leader, Keith Rhinehart. Included in these news reports
were allegations that Rhinehart is a "Jim Jones Guyanalike leader'· of a "bizarre Seattle cult" who is "unfit to be
a religious leader," that Rhinehart's public exhibitions
are "consciously perpetrated frauds" and his seances a
··ripoff." The reports also charged that the Foundation
is, in fact, Rhinehart's "alter ego," that the Foundation
uses its ··wealth to buy religious converts" and that
Rhinehart makes his money "by selling dimes tore jewelry" for "thousands of dollars.'· In response to these
allegations, Rhinehart and members of the Aquarian
Foundation sued the Seattle Times for defamation.
Rhinehart's claimed damages focused on an alleged
loss of membership and contributions to the Foundation. Yet, at civil discovery, Rhinehart refused to produce information concernin!?; these allegations.
Rhinehart and the Foundation claimed "that revealing
the information they did have would violate a pledge of
secrecy made to the donors and would violate the members' rights to privacy, freedom of religion and freedom
of association." The trial court ordered the Foundation
to provide this information. In response to this order,
the Foundation sought a protective order to prohibit the
Seattle Times from disseminating information it acquired
through the discovery process.
The Foundation claimed that: 1) it would lose members and donors if their identities are publicized, and
that potential members and donors would be deterred
from joining or supporting the church, and 2) its members feared economic reprisal and [physical] harassment
if the public learned of their link with the Foundation.
Objecting to this motion for a protective order, the
Seattle Times argued that the proposed order would be
an unconstitutional prior restraint and that the threat to
First Amendment rights was "aggravated by the fact that
these orders are requested in the context of a libel action
which, itself, seeks to punish the defendants for prior
publications, and which has an inherent (and presu317

mably intended) effect of chilling future exercise of First
Amendment rights."
The trial court, on a motion for reconsideration,
granted the protective order. The court concluded that
the Foundation had shown "reasonable grounds" necessitating a protective order which prohibited publishing
any information learned in discovery about the Foundation's "financial affairs'· and various individuals' names
and addresses. The protective order, however, was limited in that it did not extend to "the fruits of discovery
[which] are made public through the judicial process [or
by others independently of discovery]."
The basis of the trial court order was the belief that:
"[i]f protective orders are not available, it could have a
chilling effect on a party's willingness to bring his case to
court .... [A]ccess to the courts [should be put] on an
equal plane of importance with freedom of the press
because it is through the courts that our fundamental
freedoms are protected and enforced." The Seattle Times
appealed the trial court decision to the Washington Supreme Court. Although recognizing that the order was a
prior restraint on the press, a maJority of the state Supreme Court upheld the order since "the interest of the
judiciary in the integrity of its discovery processes is
sufficient to meet the 'heavy burden' ofjustification" for
the restraint in question.
In October 1983, the Supreme Court granted the
Seattle Times' petition to hear the case. Since the press
possesses a substantial First Amendment right to disseminate newsworthy information, the Seattle Times argues that the probative order should be nullified on two
related grounds: 1) the protective order was based on
speculative concerns unsupported by findings and thus
does not justify a curb on First Amendment rights, and
2) the Court should apply a test which closely scrutinizes
granting protective orders. In countering the Seattle
Times' argument, the Aquarian Foundation does not
question that the newspaper's First Amendment rights
are implicated by the lawsuit. Yet, rather than applying a
··close scrutiny" test, the Foundation feels that its First
Amendment rights of religious freedom, association,
privacy and access to the courts should be balanced
against the newspaper's "free press" interest. The Foundation also argues that any First Amendment rights
implicated in discovery are sufficiently protected by the
good cause standards which govern issuing protective
orders in Washington courts.
The issue of whether a "balancing" or ·'close scrutiny" test should be applied will probably be determinative to this lawsuit. The "balancing" test is premised on
the notion that freedom of press cannot be preferred
over any other First Amendment freedom. The Foundation argues that the balance should be struck in its
favor because publication of Foundation members and
contributors will discourage future participation with
the Foundation and lead to physical harassment of

Foundation members. Affidavits of various Foundation
members support these claims. Rather than strenuously
dispute this claim, the Seattle Times argues that freedom
of the press - as illustrated by several federal court
decisions- demands heightened judicial scrutiny.
The Seattle Times suggests that the Court apply the
"close scrutiny" test developed by the D.C. Court of
Appeals in In Re Halkin (598 F.2d 176 ( 1979)). The
Halkin test would require that this criteria be met prior
to granting a protective order: "the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise, and
there must be no alternative means of protecting the
public interest which intrudes less directly on expression." This test would require the Court to determine
how each document or claim of information will cause
concrete harm. Since most of the information sought to
be restrained through the protective order will become
public (and thus publishable) at the time of trial, the
Seattle Times argues that the protective order should be
quashed since it merely "permit[s] one litigant, for tactical reasons, to control the timing and manner of disclosure." The Aquarian Foundation disputes this claim. It
argues that, without the protective order, it would be
unable to disclose all relevant facts to facilitate the administration of justice.
The Aquarian Foundation also argues that Washington's "good cause" requirement, which governs protective orders, sufficiently protects the newspaper's First
Amendment interests. In support of this contention, the
Foundation suggests that "[c]ourts have inherent power
to control their own proceedings in the pursuit of justice
and have full power to prohibit a party ... from divulging otherwise private information divulged through the
court's own processes." The Seattle Times, although not
specifically addressing this claim, posits that "[a]bstract
concepts, such as the 'integrity' of the judicial system,
cannot by themselves support the drastic curb upon
expression effected by the protective order."
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Seattie Times is more a case of great symbolic value
than a case of immediate practical significance. In all
likelihood, the information covered by the protective
order will be made public (and thus publishable) at trial.
Consequently, neither party stands that much to gain or
lose by the Supreme Court decision. The Seattle Times
will have an opportunity to publish the information
subject to the protective order at the time of trial. The
Aquarian Foundation will not be able to absolutely foreclose the publication of information subject to the protective order. The case thus boils down to whether
freedom of the press should be accorded such constitutional weight as to virtually eliminate protective orders,
or whether access to the courts should be accorded such
constitutional weight as to justify protective orders
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whenever discovery will likely lead to the publication of
information harmful to the interests of one of the parties in the lawsuit.
Where should the balance be struck? The right to
disseminate information learned in civil litigation is
rooted in the basic First Amendment "principle that
debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust
and wideopen.'' (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964)) Additionally, lawsuits are themselves
newsworthy and frequently involve matters of public
concern. In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that
civil litigation is itself a First Amendment activity. (See,
e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,429 (1963))
Notwithstanding the primacy of freedom of the
press protections, the Aquarian Foundation also has the
fundamental right to bring its grievances before the
courts. In the context of Seattle Times, access to the courts
is particularly significant since the case affects the ability
of a religious group to seek members and solicit funds.
Considering the unpopularity of the Foundation and its
beliefs, scrupulous protection of the First Amendment
rights of its members and donors is particularly important. (See, e.g., Brown v. Dade Christian School Inc., 556
F.2d 310, 317 (5th Cir. 1977)) Additionally, protective
orders may encourage full disclosure of relevant information and thus result in a more complete adjudication of the merits of a case.
The values of access to the courts, freedom of religion and freedom of press are all central to our constitutional scheme. Seattle Times, by presenting the Court with
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an opportunity to adopt a standard of review for protective orders, will help determine how these First Amendment values should play against each other.
ARGUMENTS

For Rhinehart, the Aquarian Foundation, et al.
1. The protective order is justified since the First
Amendment rights of Aquarian Foundation members and donors outweigh the First Amendment
rights of the Seattle Times.
2. The protective order satisfies the ''close scrutiny" test
advocated by the Seattle Times.
3. Washington's rules of procedure governing protective orders are sufficiently comprehensive to encompass possible countervailing First Amendment
concerns.
For the Seattle Times, et al.
1. The Court should adopt the ''close scrutiny" test delineated in In re Halkin to fully recognize the First
Amendment interest in dissemination and the limited
government interest in protective orders.
2. The Aquarian Foundation failed to introduce sufficient evidence to justify a protective order.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS

The American Civil Liberties Union in association
with various newspaper associations filed an amicus
brief in support of the Seattle Times, with arguments
identical to those made by the Seattle Times' brief.
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